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LIMITATION OF ACTIONS - NORTH DAKOTA ADOPTS
CONTINUOUS REPRESENTATION RULE FOR
TOLLING STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN LEGAL
MALPRACTICE ACTIONS
Between 1969 and 1971, physicians Wendell Wall and Glen
Wiltse (Doctors) employed Bayard Lewis and the Lewis Law
Office (Lewis) to create various trust agreements in order to shield
medical partnership income from taxation.1 The Internal Reve-
nue Service (IRS) audited the partnership's returns and issued defi-
ciency notices to the Doctors in 1977.2 After receiving the
deficiency notices, the Doctors consulted with a tax attorney,
Douglas Christensen, who informed them that they may have a
malpractice action against Lewis for his preparation of the trust
agreements.a The Doctors then spoke with Lewis who maintained
that the trusts were properly drafted and thereafter, the Doctors,
with Lewis to represent them, agreed to sue the IRS in federal
court to overturn the assessments.4 On January 1, 1979, Lewis
took office as a county judge, and on July 2, 1979, Lewis hired Ger-
ald Rufer to sue the IRS in federal court on behalf of the Doctors.5
After July 2, 1979, Lewis had little contact with either Rufer or the
Doctors.6 The federal tax action was decided against the Doctors
on December 9, 1981, and on September 9, 1983, the Doctors
commenced a malpractice action against Lewis in Richland
County District Court of North Dakota.7 Lewis claimed that the
two-year statute of limitations had expired pursuant to section 28-
01-18 of the North Dakota Century Code, but this defense was
stricken by an order of the district court.8 The district court's
order was appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court and
1. Wall v. Lewis, 393 N.W.2d 758, 760 (N.D. 1986).
2. Id. The IRS audited the partnership's returns for the years 1972 and 1973 and
issued the tax deficiency notices to the Doctors in 1977. Id.
3. Id. Christensen reviewed a number of options available to the Doctors, one of
which was a malpractice action against Lewis. Id.
4. Id. Lewis advised the Doctors to sue the IRS to have the assessments overturned.
Id. In addition, Lewis agreed to represent the Doctors and to waive his fee if the
assessments were not in fact overturned. Id.
5. Id. Lewis agreed to pay all of Rufer's legal fees in the Doctors' tax action against the
IRS. Id.
6. Id. After July 2, 1979, Rufer handled the Doctors' entire suit against the IRS without
any apparent interjection by Lewis. Id.
7. Id. The Doctors originally commenced two separate malpractice actions against
Lewis, but they were subsequently consolidated by stipulation. Id.
8. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18(3) (1974 & Supp. 1987). Section 28-01-18(3)
provides in relevant part: "The following actions must be commenced within two years
after the claim for relief has accrued:... 3. An action for the recovery of damages resulting
from malpractice...." N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18(3) (1974 & Supp. 1987).
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reversed.9 On remand, Lewis moved for summary judgment.'"
The district court entered summary judgment for Lewis, conclud-
ing that the two-year malpractice statute of limitations had
expired." The Doctors appealed and the North Dakota Supreme
Court held that the statute of limitations should have been tolled
while Lewis was still representing the Doctors in the tax defi-
ciency suit, thereby adopting the continuous representation rule.12
Furthermore, the court held that in applying the continuous rep-
resentation rule, a question of material fact remained as to when
Lewis' representation of the Doctors had in fact ended, and there-
fore remanded the case to the district court on this issue.' 3 Wall v.
Lewis, 393 N.W.2d 758 (N.D. 1986).
Traditionally, in ordinary negligence suits, an action accrues
and the statute of limitations commences to run when the defend-
ant commits a wrongful or negligent act or omission.14 The ration-
ale for the rule, which is commonly called the occurrence rule,
was articulated in the 1830 case of Wilcox v. Plummer.'5 In Wil-
cox, the plaintiffs retained Plummer, an attorney, to collect the
balance due on a note endorsed to them. 6 When the maker of the
note proved insolvent, Plummer sued Hawkins, an endorser on
the note, but the writ misnamed the plaintiffs.' 7 As a result of this
9. Wall, 393 N.W.2d at 760; see Wall v. Lewis, 366 N.W.2d 471, 474 (N.D. 1985) (court
concluded that the Doctors had incurred injury when the tax deficiency notices were
issued, but also indicated that a determination of when the Doctors should have discovered
Lewis' negligent act was necessary to determine when the statute of limitations began to
run).
10. Wall, 393 N.W.2d at 760.
11. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18(3) (1974 & Supp. 1987). For the relevant text
of § 28-01-18(3), see supra note 8. The district court held that the Doctors' cause of action
accrued by September 1977, because they should have discovered the injury, its cause, and
Lewis' possible negligence by that time. Wall, 393 N.W.2d at 760. Therefore, since the
Doctors did not file the malpractice action until September 1983, the district court
determined that the statute of limitations had expired, thus barring the Doctors' claim. Id.
12. Wall, 393 N.W.2d at 764.
13. Id. at 765. The case was remanded to determine if Lewis had made any contacts
with the Doctors or Rufer within two years prior to September 9, 1983, which would
constitute legal advice or representation sufficient to establish continuous representation,
and therefore, toll the statute of limitations. Id.
14. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 389, at 446-48 (2d ed. 1981).
According to Mallen and Levit, pursuant to the occurrence rule, the statute of limitations
commences to run upon occurrence of the essential facts which constitute a cause of action,
regardless of whether the client knows of these facts or whether the client is actually
damaged at that point. Id. at 446.
15. 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 172 (1830); see also R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 14, § 389, at
448-50 (1981) (the occurrence rule, first established in Wilcox v. Plummer, has been
adopted by virtually every state at one time or another).
16. Wilcox v. Plummer, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 172, 173 (1830). The note at issue in Wilcox was
drawn by Edmund Banks on October 2, 1819, and was payable to John Hawkins two
months after that date. Id. Hawkins endorsed the note on November 9, 1819, to Hinton
and Brame, and they subsequently endorsed the note to Wilcox. Id.
17. Id. at 180. Plummer first sued Banks, the drawer of the note, on February 7, 1820.
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mistake, a judgment of nonsuit was eventually entered against the
plaintiffs," In addition, the plaintiffs were unable to take further
action against Hawkins because the statute of limitations had then
expired.' 9 Subsequently, Plummer died and the plaintiffs sued his
estate for Plummer's alleged negligence in handling the collection
of the note. 2° The Executors of Plummer's estate asserted that the
three-year statute of limitations applicable to the action had
expired and therefore argued that the plaintiffs' claim ought to be
barred. 2' The jury in the United States Circuit Court for the Dis-
trict of North Carolina found Plummer negligent, but the circuit
judges were divided on when the statute of limitations com-
menced and consequently, directed the controversy to be certified
to the United States Supreme Court.22 The Supreme Court deter-
mined that the cause of action against Plummer accrued at the
time of the negligence, despite the absence of any actual damage
at that time.23 The Court reasoned that the suffering of actual
damage was irrelevant in determining when the cause of action
accrued.24 Therefore, the Court concluded that the statute of lim-
itations began to run at the time the negligent act occurred, which
was when Plummer issued the writ in the name of the wrong
plaintiffs.2
Id. When Banks proved insolvent, Plummer then brought the action against Hawkins, an
endorser, on February 8, 1821, but the plaintiffs were misnamed in the writ. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 173, 180. The plaintiff's complaint consisted of two causes of action against
Plummer's estate. Id. at 173, 181. The first claim was based upon Plummer's failure to
institute a suit against the endorser of the overdue note (Hawkins) until November 9, 1822,
when the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 173, 181. The second action
was based upon Plummer's negligent and unskilled handling of the suit against the endorser
of the note. Id.
21. See id. at 174. The first cause of action, the defendants argued, arose at the time
when Plummer should have sued the endorser. Id. This time, according to the defendants,
was at a point within a reasonable time after receiving the note for collection, or, at the
latest, at a point in time after the failure to collect from the maker of the note. Id. As to the
second cause of action, it was the defendants' contention that this action accrued at the
time when Plummer committed the blunder of issuing the writ misnaming the plaintiffs.
Id.
22. Id. at 173-74.
23. Id. at 182-83. The Court reasoned that once the attorney was chargeable with
negligence or unskillfulness, the attorney-client contract was violated, and the client
immediately had a cause of action. Id. at 182. Therefore, the Court concluded that the first
cause of action arose when Plummer should have sued the endorser and the second cause of
action when Plummer erred by misnaming the plaintiffs in the writ. Id. at 183. In so
concluding, the Court adopted the reasoning of the defendants. For a discussion of the
defendants' argument, see supra note 21 and accompanying text.
24. Wilcox, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) at 182. The Court reasoned that once the attorney acted
negligently, the contract was violated and an action could be sustained immediately. Id.
The Court noted that if at this time only nominal damages have been incurred, only
nominal damages could be recovered. Id. Therefore, the Court stressed that it was not the
suffering of damage which commenced the running of the statute of limitations. Id.
25. Id. at 182-83. The Court reasoned that once it was determined when the actual
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In Wilcox, the United States Supreme Court adopted a rigid
rule whereby the statute of limitations commenced to run at the
time of the negligent act, regardless of whether the injured party
was aware of the negligence, or whether actual damage had
occurred.26 In addition, the Court in Wilcox did not consider the
difficulties of applying the occurrence rule to professional malprac-
tice.27 These problems, however, were addressed in Neel v.
Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand.21 In Neel, the defend-
ant attorneys of the Magana law firm failed to serve a summons
within the required time period after the plaintiffs' complaint had
been filed, and as a result, the plaintiffs' case was dismissed on
December 10, 1965.29 The plaintiffs did not know or suspect that
a dismissal had been granted until they consulted independent
counsel on December 21, 1967.30 When the plaintiffs brought an
action against the attorneys of the Magana law firm, the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County followed the occurrence rule and
therefore barred the claim due to the expiration of the applicable
breach occurred, an action could be instituted, and from that time the statute of limitations
must run. Id. at 182. Therefore, in Wilcox, the United States Supreme Court developed
what is commonly referred to as the occurrence rule of accrual for statutes of limitations.
See id. at 182-83; see also Jewell v. Price, 264 N.C. 459, -, 142 S.E.2d 1, 3-4 (1965) (Wilcox
cited as precedent for development of occurrence rule).
26. See Wilcox, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) at 182. The Court in reaching its decision strictly
adhered to the long-standing rule that the statute of limitations should run from the date
when the negligence occurred, and not from the time the plaintiff is damaged, or when the
injury is discovered. Id.
27. See id. at 172-83; see R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 14, § 389, at 450.
According to Mallen and Levit, the problem in applying the occurrence rule to professional
malpractice is that the rule is better suited to ordinary negligence actions. Id. Ordinary
negligence actions usually involve an accident in which an injury is immediately
ascertainable and the causes can be easily and readily identified or investigated. Id. Thus,
there would be little harm in requiring a plaintiff to act promptly. Id. In a legal malpractice
context, however, an attorney's error may not be discoverable for some time. Id.
28. 6 Cal. 3d 176, 491 P.2d 421, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1971).
29. Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 179-80, 491 P.2d
421, 422, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 838 (1971). Gerald Neel initially hired Delaney, an attorney, to
file a wrongful death action against San Bernadino County. Id. at 179, 491 P.2d at 422, 98
Cal. Rptr. at 838. Delaney, without informing the plaintiffs, associated as counsel the law
firm of Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand. Id. at 179-80, 491 P.2d at 422, 98 Cal.
Rptr. at 838. On May 25, 1962, Delaney filed a complaint against San Bernadino County,
but neither Delaney nor the defendant attorneys of the Magana Law Firm arranged for
service of the summons, and on December 10, 1965, the case was dismissed for the
plaintiffs' failure to serve a summons within three years. Id. at 180, 491 P.2d at 422, 98 Cal.
Rptr. at 838.
30. Id. at 180, 491 P.2d at 422, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 838. The plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants fraudulently concealed their negligence from the plaintiffs. Id. at 180, 491 P.2d
at 422, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 838. The plaintiffs further contended that during 1966 and 1967,
the defendants falsely represented to them that the suit against the county was still
pending. Id. at 180, 491 P.2d at 422, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 838. However, in a subsequent
deposition, plaintiff Gary Neel revealed that the misrepresentations referred to in the
complaint were made by Delaney and not the defendants. Id. at 180, 491 P.2d at 422, 98
Cal. Rptr. at 838.
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statute of limitations.3'
The California Supreme Court reversed the decision, rejected
the use of the occurrence rule, and adopted instead the discovery
rule for all professional malpractice actions.32 In rejecting the
application of the occurrence rule to legal malpractice actions, the
court reasoned that since the practice of law entails a high degree
of professional skill and knowledge, it would be highly unlikely
that a client would be able to detect a negligent act or omission,
and therefore, any possible claim the client may have could expire
with the running of the statute of limitations.33 In addition, the
court noted that not only may the client fail to recognize negli-
gence when he sees it, he may often be denied any opportunity to
see it since attorneys work out of the view of their clients.3 4 The
court recognized that the discovery rule, which provides for com-
mencement of the statute of limitations at the time the negligent
act is discovered, could alleviate many of these problems. 35 The
court reasoned that in highly specialized professions such as
medicine or law, the client will not be able to detect the negli-
gence of the professional at the moment it occurs. 36 Therefore,
the court held that in a legal malpractice case, a cause of action
would not accrue until the client discovers, or should discover, the
facts establishing the elements of his cause of action.3 7 In adopting
31. Id. at 180, 491 P.2d at 422, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 838. The statute of limitations provided
that an action in legal malpractice had to be brought within two years of the negligent act.
Id. at 180, 491 P.2d at 422, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
32. Id. at 179, 491 P.2d at 422, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 838. The court recognized that prior to
Neel, California applied the occurrence rule to legal malpractice actions. Id. at 179, 491
P.2d at 422, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 838. In all other professional malpractice actions, however, the
court noted that California applied the discovery rule. Id. at 179, 491 P.2d at 422, 98 Cal.
Rptr. at 838.
33. Id. at 188, 491 P.2d at 428, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 844. The court noted that due to the
high degree of knowledge and skill possessed by an attorney, a client may very well be
unable to detect a negligent act even if he sees it. Id. at 188, 491 P.2d at 428, 98 Cal. Rptr.
at 844.
34. Id. at 188, 491 P.2d at 428, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 844. The court recognized that "the
doctor operates on an unconscious patient; although the attorney... serves the conscious
client, much of their work must be performed out of the client's view." Id. at 188, 491 P.2d
at 428, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
35. Id. at 187-88, 491 P.2d at 428, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
36. Id. at 188, 491 P.2d at 428, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 844. The court noted that a client
"cannot be expected to know the relative medical merits of alternative anesthetics, nor the
various legal exceptions to the hearsay rule." Id. at 188, 491 P.2d at 428, 98 Cal. Rptr. at
844. If a client were expected to ascertain the malpractice at the moment it occurred, the
court recognized that a client would have to hire a second professional to observe the
actions of the first. Id. at 188, 491 P.2d at 428, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 844. This, the court noted,
would be both impractical and expensive, and would also destroy the confidential
relationship between the professional and his client. Id. at 188, 491 P.2d at 428, 98 Cal.
Rptr. at 844.
37. Id. at 194, 491 P.2d at 433, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 849. The court noted that the discovery
rule had been adopted in medical malpractice actions and had been extended to use in
actions against other professions as well. Id. at 185, 491 P.2d at 426, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 842.
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the discovery rule, the California Supreme Court followed the
majority of states who have either altered the occurrence rule or
have replaced it with the discovery rule.3"
A rule derived from the discovery rule and probably the most
popular approach in determining when a legal malpractice action
accrues is the damage rule.39 Under the damage rule, the statute
of limitations commences to run from the time when actual dam-
age is incurred by the plaintiff.40 The damage rule first appeared
in the 1967 case of Fort Myers Seafood Packers v. Steptoe & John-
son.4 1 In Fort Myers, the defendant attorney was hired to draft a
contract for his client, the terms of which would obligate the plain-
tiff to send its fishing boats into Venezuelan waters to fish and sell
its catch to a Venezuelan processor for resale to the defendant's
client.4 2  The plaintiff signed the contract as drafted by the
defendant, and the defendant then filed and processed the appli-
cation with the Maritime Administration for approval of the char-
ters for the plaintiff's boats.43 On July 25, 1962, the plaintiff's
boats entered Venezuelan waters and were impounded because
The court stated that it was suspicious for judges as former legal practitioners to apply the
more restrictive occurrence rule to attorneys while applying the discovery rule to other
professions. Id. at 190-91, 491 P.2d at 429-30, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 845-46. Therefore, the court
concluded that in actions for professional malpractice against an attorney, the cause of
action accrues when the plaintiff knows, or should know, of all material facts essential to
show the existence of a cause of action. Id. at 190, 491 P.2d at 430, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
38. Id. at 194, 491 P.2d at 433, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 848; see also, Simmons v. Ocean, 544 F.
Supp. 841, 844 (D.V.I. 1982) (statute of limitations for legal malpractice may be tolled until
the client discovers, or should reasonably have discovered, the malpractice); Bonanno v.
Potthoff, 527 F. Supp. 561, 565 (N.D. Ill. 1981)(cause of action for legal malpractice accrues
when client discovered, or should have discovered, the factors establishing the elements of
his cause of action); Arizona Management Corp. v. Kallof, 142 Ariz. 64, __, 688 P.2d 710,
712 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (legal malpractice claims accrue when the client knows or should
have known of his attorney's negligence); Luick v. Rademacher, 129 Mich. App. 803, -,
342 N.W.2d 617, 619 (1983) (action accrues when plaintiff knows of the alleged malpractice
and has sustained identifiable and appreciable harm as a consequence thereof); Kueneke v.
Jeggle, 658 S.W.2d 516, 518 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (statute of limitations does not begin to run
until the point of discovery, or if no discovery has occurred, at the end of ten years from the
date of fraud). Mallen and Levit contend that the reason a few jurisdictions still adhere to
the occurrence rule is its deep historical roots, rather than its logic. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT,
supra note 14, § 389, at 451. Mallen and Levit state that with the trend towards liberalizing
accrual rules for statutes of limitations, virtually no jurisdictions have returned to a pure
occurrence rule for legal malpractice actions. Id.
39. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 14, § 390, at 451-52.
40. Id.
41. 127 App. D.C. 93, -., 381 F.2d 261, 262 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 946
(1968).
42. Fort Myers Seafood Packers v. Steptoe & Johnson, 127 App. D.C. 93, -, 381 F.2d
261, 262 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 946 (1968). The contracts were drawn up
by the defendant attorney at the request of Modgeberg, a client of the law firm. Id. at -,
381 F.2d at 262. The plaintiffs were to sell their catch to a Venezuelan processor who
would then resell the processed fish to Modgeberg. Id. at -, 381 F.2d at 262.
43. Id. at -, 381 F.2d at 262. The defendant admitted that in filing and processing the
applications with the Maritime Administration, he had acted as the attorney for the
plaintiffs. Id. at -, 381 F.2d at 262.
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their entry under only the American registry was illegal." The
plaintiff boat owner filed suit against the attorney-draftsman on
July 22, 1965, which was more than three years after the negligent
advice was given, but less than three years after the Venezuelan
government seized the boats.45  The district court applied the
occurrence rule, holding that the three-year statute of limitations
for legal malpractice should begin to run from the date the negli-
gent advice was given, and therefore, the action was barred by the
expiration of the statute of limitations.46
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit reversed the decision and adopted the damage rule,
concluding that the statute of limitations should begin to run when
a plaintiff suffers injury.47 In addition, the court ruled that if in
fact the boats were impounded as a result of the defendant's negli-
gent advice, the statute of limitations would begin to run at the
time of seizure because that was when the plaintiffs were
damaged.48
The damage rule, much like the discovery rule, ameliorates
much of the unfairness which would result from the use of the
occurrence rule in legal malpractice actions.49 In their treatise on
legal malpractice, Mallen and Levit state, however, that the appli-
cation of the discovery rule may often lead to an arbitrary factual
44. Id. at __, 381 F.2d at 262. Leavitt, an employee of Steptoe & Johnson, wrote to
Fort Myers Seafood Packers on August 15, 1962, stating: "It is too bad that we did not know
the Venezuelan requirements .... We could have avoided all of the present difficulty by
filing the proper applications with the Maritime Administration." Id. at -, 381 F.2d at 262.
45. Id. at __, 381 F.2d at 262. The contracts were drawn up on May 16, 1962, by the
defendant. Id. at -, 381 F.2d at 262. The plaintiff filed the malpractice action against the
defendant on July 22, 1965, some 38 months after the contracts were drawn up. Id. at -,
381 F.2d at 262.
46. Id. at -, 381 F.2d at 262. The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia ruled that the three-year statute of limitations in negligence actions should
commence to run when the defendant commits the act which later results in injury. Id. at
- 381 F.2d at 262. Therefore, since the act which caused the injury occurred on May 16,
1962, more than three years after the plaintiffs filed suit, the court stated that the action was
barred by the three-year statute of limitations. Id. at __, 381 F.2d at 262.
47. Id. at -, 381 F.2d at 262. The court in Fort Myers noted that while several state
courts have held that a cause of action for malpractice accrues when the negligent act is
committed, other courts follow the general rule whereby a cause of action accrues when the
plaintiff suffers an injury. Id. at -, 381 F.2d at 262. The court reasoned that there was no
good reason for drawing a distinction between malpractice suits and other negligence
actions and therefore concluded that a plaintiff's cause of action accrues when an injury is
sustained. Id. at -, 381 F.2d at 262.
48. Id. at -, 381 F.2d at 262. According to Mallen and Levit, in jurisdictions applying
the damage rule, the major issues are likely to be whether and when damage occurred. R.
MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 14, § 390, at 454. Problems which may arise in application
of the damage rule can take two forms according to Mallen and Levit: "(1) how to handle a
spectrum of developing and continuing damages, and (2) how to determine when a lawyer's
omission causes injury." Id. The resolution of these issues, according to the commentators,
usually involves a factual determination. Id.
49. See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 14, § 390, at 457.
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decision as to exactly when an injury occurred, especially where
there has been a continuous injury or several injuries. 0 In addi-
tion, the criteria for determining the date when the damage
occurred often varies according to jurisdiction.5 '
North Dakota applies both the discovery rule and damage
rule in determining when the statute of limitations commences to
run in legal malpractice actions.52 North Dakota's two-year statute
of limitations applicable to legal malpractice actions commences
when the plaintiff knows, or with reasonable diligence should
know, of the injury, its cause, and the defendant's possible negli-
gence. 3 In addition, the plaintiff must also sustain an actionable
injury before the statute commences to run.54  One of North
Dakota's leading cases applying these rules of accrual is Binstock v.
Tschider.
55
In Binstock, an attorney; Morris A. Tschider, was employed to
draft all of the documents for the sale of 480 acres of land from
Anton Binstock to Ralph Kilzer.56 In 1976, Kilzer purchased the
480-acre tract of land, and included in the contract was an option
for the purchase of an additional 151-acre tract.57 In December
1981, Kilzer attempted to exercise his option to purchase the addi-
tional 151-acre tract.58 Binstock refused to grant possession of the
tract, and Kilzer then hired Tschider to sue Binstock for specific
50. See id.
51. See Pancake House, Inc. v. Redmond, 239 Kan. 83,._., 716 P.2d 575, 579 (1986) (an
action accrues when substantial injury is first caused); Luick v. Rademacher, 129 Mich. App.
803, -, 342 N.W.2d 617, 618 (1983) (an action accrues when there is an identifiable and
appreciable loss); Jaramillo v. Hood, 93 N.M. 433, -, 601 P.2d 66, 67 (1979) (an action
accrues when damages are ascertainable or discoverable); Banton v. Marks, 623 S.W.2d 113,
116 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) (an action accrues when the negligence becomes irremediable).
52. See Wall v. Lewis, 366 N.W.2d 471, 473 (N.D. 1985).
53. Id. at 473; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18(3) (1974 & Supp. 1987) (malpractice
actions must be commericed within two years after the claim for relief has accrued). For
the relevant text of § 28-01-18(3), see supra note 8. In Wall, the court cited Phillips Fur &
Wool Co. v. Bailey for the proposition that in all malpractice actions, the statute of
limitations does not begin to run until, in addition to sustaining an actionable injury, the
client knows or with reasonable diligence should know of the injury, its cause, and of the
attorney's possible negligence. Wall, 366 N.W.2d at 473; see Phillips Fur & Wool Co. v.
Bailey, 340 N.W.2d 448, 449 (N.D. 1983) (statute of limitations begins to run when plaintiff
knows or with reasonable diligence should know of the injury, its cause, and defendant's
possible negligence).
54. Wall, 366 N.W.2d at 473. The North Dakota Supreme Court stated that the cause
of action for legal malpractice does not accrue, and the statute of limitations does not begin
to run, until the client has suffered some damage. Id.
55. 374 N.W.2d 81 (N.D. 1985).
56. Binstock v. Tschider, 374 N.W.2d 81, 82 (N.D. 1985). There was a dispute between
Binstock and Kilzer as to whether Tschider was representing Binstock, Kilzer, or both of
the parties at the time the contract was drafted. Id. at 82 n.2.
57. Id. at 82. Binstock initially offered the sale of both the 480-acre tract and the 151-
acre tract of land through a realtor. Id. Binstock maintained, however, that he never
agreed to grant Kilzer an option to purchase the 151-acre tract. Id. at 82 n.1.
58. Id. at 82.
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performance. 59 When Binstock was ordered by the court to honor
Kilzer's option, Binstock commenced a suit against Tschider for
negligence in drafting the legal documents for the sales transac-
tion."0 Tschider filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming
that the action was barred by the two-year statute of limitations set
forth in section 28-01-18 of the North Dakota Century Code.
61
The trial court granted Tschider summary judgment and Binstock
appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court.62
The issues before the North Dakota Supreme Court were
when the cause of action accrued and whether the two-year stat-
ute of limitations had expired.63 The court reasoned that Binstock
should have realized that he had been injured by the option agree-
ment when he first examined copies of the land sales documents
sent to him by Tschider in September 1976.64 The court deter-
mined that Binstock should have known that Tschider was the
cause of the injury and that he had incurred damage at the time he
examined the documents. 65 Based on this reasoning, the North
Dakota Supreme Court held that any cause of action against
Tschider arose when Binstock received and examined copies of
the documents executed in the land transaction.66 Therefore, the
court concluded that the statute of limitations commenced to run
in September 1976, because at that time Binstock had incurred
damage, and knew or with reasonable diligence should have
59. Id. The trial court granted Kilzer specific performance of the option agreement
and, in addition, damages for the reasonable rental value of the property in question for
1982. Id.
60. Id. Binstock claimed that he signed blank documents for the sale of the 480-acre
tract of land and that there was no mention of an option in which Kilzer could purchase the
151-acre tract at a later time. Id. Tschider asserted that no blank documents were signed
and that Binstock executed a fully-drafted option agreement. Id.
61. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18(3) (1974 & Supp. 1987) (two-year statute of
limitations for attorney malpractice). For the relevant text of § 28-01-18(3), see supra note
8.
62. Binstock, 374 N.W.2d at 83.
63. Id. at 82-83.
64. Id. at 84-85. Binstock argued that he was not injured until he actually lost his 151-
acre tract through the exercise of the option, but the North Dakota Supreme Court
reasoned that the option was an encumbrance which reduced the value of the land. Id. at
85. Furthermore, the court stated that the option agreement limited the right of
disposition and in a sense prevented Binstock from making any further improvements for
fear that the investments in the improvements would be lost if the option was exercised by
Kilzer. Id. Consequently, the court concluded that Binstock had in fact been injured when
he received and examined copies of the land contracts. Id. at 84-85.
65. Id. at 84. Binstock claimed that Tschider concealed the cause of action against him,
and therefore argued that the statute of limitations should be tolled during this time. Id. at
85. The North Dakota Supreme Court, however, found no material facts to substantiate
Binstock's claim. Id.
66. Id. at 84. In reaching its conclusion, the court looked to a deposition in which
Binstock testified that as of September 1976, he knew. that the option agreement existed
and that unless something was done, the option on the property could be exercised. Id.
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known of the alleged injury, the injury's alleged cause, and the
defendant's possible negligence.6 7
Unlike any of the three previously mentioned rules of accrual
for statutes of limitations, the continuous representation rule is an
exception to the general rules of accrual.68 Once it is determined
pursuant to either the occurrence, discovery, or damage rule, that
the statute of limitations has commenced in a legal malpractice
action between an attorney and a client, the continuous represen-
tation rule operates to toll the statute of limitations while the attor-
ney continues to represent the client.69 Also unlike the three
previous rules, the continuous representation rule has no connec-
tion to the elements of the cause of action, but rather focuses solely
upon the attorney-client relationship.7 °
The continuous representation rule was first applied to legal
malpractice actions in the case of Wilson v. Econom. 71 The mal-
practice cause of action in Wilson arose on July 6, 1963, when an
attorney failed to file the plaintiff's personal injury action against
the Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority
(Authority) within the period required for actions taken against
the Authority.7 2 When the client inquired as to the status of the
case, her questions were met with evasive responses, and finally
she was told that her attorney had left the state.7" After filing a
67. Id. at 84-85. In support of the court's conclusion as to the date for commencing the
statute of limitations, Binstock himself testified that he and his son did not make any major
improvements to the property after September 1976 because they knew that the option on
the property might be exercised, and that as long as the option existed, they would be
unable to sell the land. Id. at 84. Therefore, Binstock essentially admitted to knowing of an
injury in September 1976. See id. at 84-85 (court stated that the review of the information
presented to the trial court showed there was no material issue of genuine fact as to
whether the plaintiff's claim was time barred).
68. See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 14, § 391, at 460.
69. Id. The contin ous representation rule, according to Mallen and Levit, is fair to all
parties involved because it permits the attorney to attempt to remedy a bad result even
when the client knows of the attorney's error, while preserving any potential claim the
client may have against the attorney by tolling the statute of limitations. Id.
70. See id.
71. 56 Misc. 2d 272, 288 N.Y.S.2d 381 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968); see R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT,
supra note 14, § 391, at 458 (first appearance of continuous representation rule was in
Wilson v. Econom).
72. Wilson v. Econom, 56 Misc. 2d 272, _288 N.Y.S.2d 381, 383 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968).
On June 5, 1962, the plaintiff sustained injuries as a result of an accident with a Manhattan
and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority (Authority) bus. Id. at __, 288 N.Y.S.2d at
382. The plaintiff retained the defendant to represent her shortly after the accident, but
the summons and complaint were not served until December 1963. Id. at -, 288 N.Y.S.2d
at 382. The Authority in its answer offered the affirmative defense that the action was
barred by the statute of limitations of one year and thirty days for all actions against the
Authority. Id. at -, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 382.
73. Id. at -, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 383. The client claimed that on one occasion the
defendant attorney told her that her case would not reach trial for three years, and when
she called again, she was informed that the defendant had left New York. Id. at __, 288
N.Y.S.2d at 383.
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complaint with the bar association, the client began a legal mal-
practice action against the attorney in the Supreme Court of New
York County in October 1967. 7 ' The defendant argued that the
cause of action in a malpractice case accrued when the malprac-
tice occurs, and consequently, that the plaintiff's claim should be
denied since the three-year statute of limitations had expired.75
The court was concerned, however, that an attorney had the abil-
ity to defeat a client's cause of action against him by appearing to
represent the client while actually running out the statute of limi-
tations.7 6 Consequently, instead of barring the plaintiff's claim
pursuant to the occurrence rule, the court applied the last treat-
ment rule (another name for the continuous representation rule),
which had previously been applied in medical malpractice actions
to toll the statute of limitations while the physician continued
treatment of his patient.77
As applied to legal malpractice actions, the continuous repre-
sentation rule protects the attorney-client relationship in that the
client is not forced to seek other legal advice because his claim will
be preserved for as long as the attorney continues to represent
him on the matter which is alleged to have been negligently han-
dled.78 In approving this rationale, other states have adopted the
continuous representation rule, making it the modern trend in
legal malpractice actions.79
74. Id. at -, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 383. The malpractice action against the attorney took
place nearly four years after the missed filing date for the client's original action against the
Authority. Id. at -, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 383.
75. Id. at -, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 383. The defendant reasoned that the statute of
limitations commenced to run on July 6, 1963, the date that the plaintiff's cause of action
against the Authority expired. Id. at -, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 383. Since the malpractice action
against the defendant was not filed until October 1967, the defendant concluded that the
action against him should be barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at -, 288 N.Y.S.2d at
383.
76. Id. at -, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 384. The court was disturbed that in alleged malpractice
cases such as this one, an attorney who was evasive or one that claimed to be continuing to
act on the client's behalf, could actually extinguish a malpractice claim against him by
holding on to the case for three years. Id. at __, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 384.
77. Id. at -, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 383-84. The court noted that the general rule in
malpractice actions is that the statute of limitations runs from the time the malpractice
occurs. Id. at -, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 383. The court recognized, however, that there was a well
recognized exception to this rule where a doctor continues to treat a plaintiff following the
malpractice injury. Id. at -, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 383. In such a case, the court noted that the
statute of limitations runs from the date of the last treatment by the doctor. Id. at __, 288
N.Y.S.2d at 383. The court could see no strong reason for limiting this exception to medical
malpractice, and therefore extended the application of the last treatment rule to legal
malpractice as well. Id. at -, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 383.
78. See Siegel v. Kranis, 29 A.D.2d 477, __, 288 N.Y.S.2d 831, 834-35 (N.Y. App. Div.
1968) (in an attorney malpractice action where the attorney failed to file his clients' claim in
a timely manner, the court ruled that a cause of action should arise when attorney-client
relationship ended).
79. See, e.g., Citizen State Bank v. Shapiro, 575 S.W.2d 375, 387 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979)
(two-year limitations period begins to run after the attorney-client relationship ends).
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Although the North Dakota Supreme Court had previously
acknowledged the existence of the continuous representation rule,
it had not formally adopted the rule until the 1986 decision in
Wall v. Lewis."° Before the Wall court analyzed the continuous
representation rule, it first examined the applicability of the dis-
covery rule." The court stated that in North Dakota, a two-year
statute of limitations pursuant to section 28-01-18(3) of the North
Dakota Century Code applied to legal malpractice actions.8 2 Fur-
thermore, the court recognized that pursuant to the discovery
rule, the statute of limitations commences when the plaintiff
knows, or with reasonable diligence should know, of the injury, its
cause, and the defendant's possible negligence, and after he or she
has sustained actual damage. 3 The-Doctors argued that there was
a factual dispute as to whether they knew or should have known of
Lewis' negligence prior to the dismissal of their federal court
action on December 9, 1981.84 In addition, the Doctors asserted
that they did not follow Christensen's advice, but rather, they
believed Lewis' claim that the trusts were properly drafted and
that the IRS assessments would be overturned.8 5
The North Dakota Supreme Court recognized that the pur-
pose of the discovery rule was to prevent a claim from being
barred by the statute of limitations before a plaintiff could reason-
ably be aware of the claim's existence. 8 Therefore, the court
California has adopted the rule by statute. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 340.6 (West 1982)
(statute of limitations for legal malpractice action is tolled while attorney continues to
represent the plaintiff regarding the specific subject matter in which the alleged wrongful
act or omission occurred). But see, Boehm v. Wheeler, 65 Wis. 2d 668, -, 223 N.W.2d 536,
542 (1974) (it is the province of the legislature to adopt the continuous representation rule).
80. Wall v. Lewis, 393 N.W.2d 758, 761 (N.D. 1986); see Binstock v. Tschider, 374
N.W.2d 81, 85 (N.D. 1985) (court recognized continuous treatment rule but evidence did
not require its application).
81. Wall, 393 N.W.2d at 761.
82. Id. at 761; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18(3) (1974 & Supp. 1987) (two-year
statute of limitation for attorney malpractice). For the relevant text of § 28-01-18(3), see
supra note 8.
83. Wall, 393 N.W.2d at 761; see also Phillips Fur & Wool Co. v. Bailey, 340'N.W.2d
448, 449 (N.D. 1983) (two-year statute of limitations applies in legal malpractice actions and
commences to run when the plaintiff knows, or with reasonable diligence should know, of
the injury, its cause, and the defendant's possible negligence).
84. Wall, 393 N.W.2d at 761.
85. Id. The Doctors asserted that since they did not subjectively believe the tax
attorney's advice concerning Lewis' negligent acts, they should not be held to have known
that they suffered an injury until the final ruling by the federal court. Id. Therefore, the
Doctors contended that the cause of action did not accrue until the federal court made its
final ruling concerning the trusts on December 9, 1981. Id. The court rejected the
subjective belief argument of the Doctors, recognizing that the discovery rule was framed
in the context of the reasonable person, an objective standard. Id.
86. Id.; see also Anderson v. Shook, 333 N.W.2d 708, 712 (N.D. 1983) (discovery rule
protects victims of medical negligence when the patient cannot immediately recognize the
negligence because the statute of limitations will not begin to run until he discovers his
injury).
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determined that the focus of the discovery rule was whether the
Doctors were aware of facts which would have placed a reasonable
person on notice of a potential malpractice claim.87 Moreover,
although .the plaintiff's discovery or knowledge of the malpractice
was ordinarily a question of fact, the court stated that the issue
becomes one of law if, according to the evidence, reasonable
minds could have drawn but one conclusion."8 While the court
cautioned that summary judgment was rarely appropriate on the
"discovery issue," the court recognized the undisputed fact that
the Doctors had admitted that in October 1977 they were advised
by an attorney of their potential malpractice action.8 9 Conse-
quently, the court concluded that as a matter of law, the Doctors
ought to have discovered the injury, its cause and the defendant's
possible negligence on that date.90
The next issue the court examined was whether the two-year
statute of limitations was tolled by Lewis' continued representa-
tion of the Doctors.91 The Doctors contended that the statute of
limitations should be tolled during the period that Lewis contin-
ued to represent them, and that there existed issues of material
fact as to the duration of that representation. 2 The continuous
representation rule, according to the court, has been adopted in
various jurisdictions to toll the running of the statute of limitations
in malpractice actions. 3 The court then adopted the rule that in
legal malpractice actions, the continuous representation rule will
serve to toll the statute of limitations during the time an attorney
87. Wall, 393 N.W.2d at 761; see also Anderson, 333 N.W.2d at 712 (discovery rule
protects victims of medical negligence when the patient cannot immediately recognize the
negligence, because the statute of limitations will not begin to run until he should
reasonably be aware of his injury, its cause, and the physician's possible negligence).
88. Wall, 393 N.W.2d at 761; see also Belgarde v. Rosenau, 388 N.W.2d 129, 130 (N.D.
1986) (knowledge is ordinarily a question of fact inappropriate for summary judgment
unless reasonable minds could draw but one conclusion).
89. Wall, 393 N.W.2d at 761-62.
90. Id. at 762. The court refused to broaden the discovery rule to allow the Doctors to
claim that they did not discover Lewis' possible negligence until some six years after being
advised by another attorney that a malpractice action against Lewis existed. Id. The
Doctors further contended that Lewis had fraudulently concealed his negligent
construction of the trust, and therefore argued that the statute of limitations should be
tolled. Id. The court, however, in its review of the evidence, dismissed this issue as being
without merit. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. The district court held as a matter'of law that Lewis' representation ceased
when he assumed judicial office on January 1, 1979. Id. at 760.
93. Id. at 762. The continuous representation rule was briefly acknowledged but not
adopted by the North Dakota Supreme Court in the earlier case of Binstock v. Tschider.
Binstock v. Tschider, 374 N.W.2d 81 (N.D. 1985). The court in Binstock did not apply the
continuous representation rule because Binstock failed to show that Tschider, his attorney,
continued to represent him on the matter which he alleged was negligently handled. Id. at
85. For a discussion of Binstock, see supra notes 55-67 and accompanying text.
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continues to represent the client on the same transaction or sub-
ject matter as the allegedly negligent act.94
In analyzing the continuous representation rule, the court
agreed with the reasoning stated in the New York case of Siegel v.
Kranis. In Siegel, Mr. and Mrs. Siegel and their son were injured
in an automobile accident on February 15, 1960, when their car
collided with an automobile driven by Roland Rouse.96 The
Siegels, on March 2, 1960, hired Jack Kranis, an attorney, to insti-
tute an action in order to recover damages for their injuries.97
Instead of filing a claim against Rouse, Kranis filed a claim on
August 11, 1960 with the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification
Corporation (MVAIC).9" The claim was rejected by the MVAIC on
September 28, 1960 for failure to file within the prescribed statu-
tory period of ninety days after the accident.99 On November 15,
1962, Kranis demanded arbitration of the claim, but the Supreme
Court of New York County stayed arbitration pending a jury trial
where it was to be decided whether the claim to the MVAIC was
filed in a timely manner. 10 0 On September 23, 1965, a jury found
that the plaintiffs had not filed their claim with the MVAIC in a
timely manner, and on October 7, 1965, the Supreme Court of
New York County issued an order staying arbitration. 0 1 The
Siegels then commenced an action against Kranis on June 17,
1966, more than six years after the time the MVAIC ninety-day
filing period had expired, alleging malpractice for failure to file
their claim in a timely manner. 10 2 The main question before the
court was whether the plaintiffs' action against Kranis accrued on
May 15, 1960, when the ninety-day time period in which to file
their claim with the MVAIC expired, or whether the action
accrued on September 23, 1965, when the jury determined that
Kranis had untimely filed the claim with the MVAIC.1
0 3
94. Wall, 393 N.W.2d at 762. The continuous representation rule was first applied in
the legal malpractice context in two New York cases, Wilson v. Econom and Siegel v.
Kranis. For a discussion of Wilson, see supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of Siegel, see infra notes 95-110 and accompanying text.
95. Wall, 393 N.W.2d at 762; see Siegel v. Kranis, 29 A.D.2d 477, _, 288 N.Y.S.2d 831,
834-35 (1968) (cause of action arises when attorney-client relationship ends).
96. Siegel, 29 A.D.2d at -, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 832.
97. Id. at __ 288 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
98. Id. at __ 288 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
99. Id. at __ 288 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
100. Id. at __, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 833. After November 15, 1962, Kranis was unable to
represent the Siegels. Id. at -, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 833. Subsequently, his son acted as the
Siegels' attorney. Id. at -, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
101. Id. at -, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
102. Id. at __ 288 N.Y.S.2d at 833. In addition to their malpractice claim, the Siegels
commenced an action for breach of contract. Id. at -, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
103. Id. at -, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 833-34. If it was decided that the cause of action accrued
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In addressing this issue, the Siegel court first recognized that
the continuous treatment rule has been previously applied to med-
ical malpractice actions, whereby the statute of limitations is tolled
until treatment between the doctor and patient has ceased.' 04
While the continuous treatment rule had been applied only to the
medical field in the past, the Siegel court noted the relevance of
applying the rule to the legal setting.10 5 The court stated that sim-
ilarities between the attorney-client relationship and the doctor-
patient relationship existed.'0 6  Both relationships, according to
the court, were marked by trust and confidence; both were devel-
oping relationships, not sporadic; and in both relationships the
recipient of the service was disadvantaged by not being able to
question the methods or reasons employed by the attorney or doc-
tor.10 7 The court stated that the fairness of applying the "continu-
ous treatment" doctrine to the legal profession was most evident
in cases such as Siegel, where the negligence alleged by the plain-
tiff could not be known until it had been determined by another
court whether the attorney had in fact committed a negligent
act.108 To institute an action against the defendant attorney
before his negligence could be determined would, according to
the court, be premature and even presumptuous.' 0 9 Therefore,
on May 15, 1960, any further action would be barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at -,
288 N.Y.S.2d at 834. The court stated, however, that if it was decided that the cause of
action accrued on September 23, 1965, then the action against Kranis could proceed. Id. at
__ 288 N.Y.S.2d at 834.
104. Id. at -, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 834; see also Stern v. Hausberg, 22 A.D.2d 669, -, 253
N.Y.S.2d 447, 448 (1964) (statute of limitations is tolled until treatment of the patient has
ceased).
105. Siegel, 29 A.D.2d at -, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 834. In both the legal and medical
settings, the court recognized that the recipient of the service is at a disadvantage to
question the doctor or attorney about the reason why particular tactics are being employed
or about their manner of execution. Id. at __, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 834. The Siegel court looked
to observations by the Chief Judge Desmond, who in Borgia v. City of New York stated that
"[i]t would be absurd to require a wronged patient to interrupt corrective efforts by serving
a summons on the physician." Siegel, 29 A.D.2d at -, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 834-35; see Borgia v.
City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 156, 187 N.E.2d 777, 779, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319, 321-22
(1962). The Siegel court noted that this observation holds true as well in the case of a client
who has confided his cause to an attorney. Siegel, 29 A.D.2d at -, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 834-35.
The client, the court noted, is not in a position to know the intricacies of the practice of law
or whether the necessary steps in the action have been taken. Id. at -, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 835.
106. Id. at -, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 834.
107. Id. at -, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 834. The court stated that if the continuous treatment
rule were not applied to legal malpractice actions, an attorney could simply procrastinate
until the statute of limitations had expired to avoid liability for his own negligence. Id. at
__ 288 N.Y.S.2d at 835.
108. Id. at __, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 835. In Siegel, the attorney's negligence was not
definitely known until September 23, 1965, when a jury decided that the plaintiff's claim
had not been filed in a timely manner. Id. at -, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 833. The court believed
that a malpractice action against Kranis prior to September 23, 1965, would have been
premature. Id. at -, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 835.
109. Id. at __, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 835.
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the Siegel court -adopted the continuous representation doctrine
for legal malpractice actions and concluded that the statute of lim-
itations should be tolled while the attorney continues to represent
the client on the subject matter involving the alleged
negligence.110
In accepting the rationale of the Siegel court, the North
Dakota Supreme Court in Wall further stated that the continuous
representation rule protects the integrity of the attorney-client
relationship by preventing an attorney from extinguishing
through delay a client's claim 'against him."' Consequently, the
Wall court concluded that it was appropriate to apply the continu-
ous representation rule to attorney malpractice actions in North
Dakota. 112
In applying the continuous representation rule, the North
Dakota Supreme Court addressed the question of when the attor-
ney-client relationship ended between the Doctors and Lewis.' '
3
While the court had previously held that the determination of
when the attorney-client relationship ended was a question of fact,
the court found that based on the record it was difficult to assess
whether there actually were any unresolved issues of material fact
regarding the termination of Lewis' representation of the Doc-
tors.1 4  The court questioned the district court's finding that
110. Id. at -, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 834-35.
111. Wall v. Lewis, 393 N.W.2d 758, 763 (N.D. 1986); see Siegel, 29 A.D.2d at -, 288
N.Y.S.2d at 835 (if continuous representation rule did not apply to legal malpractice actions,
an attorney could be rewarded by immunity from the consequence of his negligence). In
addition to noting that the continuous representation rule prohibited an attorney from
extinguishing a claim by delay, the court stated that the continuous representation rule
affords the accused attorney an opportunity to remedy his error or establish that no error
has been committed. Wall, 393 N.W.2d at 763.
112. Wall, 393 N.W.2d at 763. The North Dakota Supreme Court in its assessment of
the continuous representation rule, recognized additional considerations for adopting the
rule which were set forth in a student note contained in the Wake Forest Law Review. Id.;
see Note, Civil Procedure - Statute of Limitations Accrual in Attorney Malpractice Actions:
Thorpe v. DeMent, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1017, 1028-29 (1984). According to the note
author, the continuous representation rule preserves the attorney-client relationship by
assuring that the attorney will put forth his best effort to preserve the client's- interest. Id.
Furthermore, speculative litigation will be avoided because the client will no longer have to
file a suit before the attorney attempts to take remedial actions to correct any possible
errors committed. Id.
113. Wall, 393 N.W.2d at 763-64. The Doctors contended that the statute of
limitations ought to be tolled during the period that Lewis represented them, and further
asserted that there was a question of fact as to when Lewis' representation ended. Id. at
763.
114. Id. at 763-64. The Wall court recognized that other courts, in applying the
continuous representation rule, have treated the question as to when an attorney-client
relationship ends as one of fact. Id. at 763. Similarly, the court noted that in medical
malpractice actions in which courts have applied the last treatment rule, from which the
continuous representation rule was derived, the determination of when the physician-
patient relationship ended has also been treated as a question of fact. Id.
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Lewis' representation ended when he assumed the bench."1 5
According to the supreme court, this fact alone was not conclusive
of the termination of his representation because there was a six-
month interval between when Lewis assumed the bench and
when Lewis hired Rufer to further represent the Doctors." 6 The
court also stated, however, that it was unwilling to go as far as to
hold that as a matter of law, the act of hiring another lawyer to
represent the Doctors constituted continuing representation by
Lewis. 1 7 Consequently, the court determined that unless there
was a factual indication of legal advice or services by Lewis to the
Doctors or Rufer within the two-year period before the Doctors
filed their action, summary judgment for Lewis would be
appropriate.""
In viewing the record on appeal, the North Dakota Supreme
Court in Wall was not convinced that there were any unresolved
issues with regard to Lewis' continuing representation of the Doc-
tors past July 1979.119 The court recognized, however, that both
of the parties had failed to focus upon the continuous representa-
tion theory during pretrial discovery because of the lack of clarity
as to whether the rule applied in North Dakota.' 2 ° Furthermore,
both parties admitted that additional evidence could become
available regarding Lewis' contacts with the Doctors if additional
discovery was conducted.' 2 ' While normally the party opposing a
motion for summary judgment is required to establish that there is
an issue of material fact, the court stated that in a unique instance
such as this, where both parties acknowledge that the issues would
115. Id. at 763-64.
116. Id. Lewis took judicial office on January 1, 1979. id. at 760. On July 2, 1979,
Lewis contracted Rufer to handle the federal tax action on the Doctors, behalf. Id. While
the district court held that Lewis' representation of the Doctors ended on January 1, 1979,
the supreme court held that Lewis' sole act of assuming the bench was not conclusive as to
when his representation of the Doctors ended. Id. at 763-64.
117. Id. at 764; contra Strong v. Pontiac Gen. Hosp., 117 Mich. App. 143, __, 323
N.W.2d 629, 631 (1982) (physician's hiring of another doctor at his own expense to treat
plaintiff's injuries was continuing treatment by the first doctor), vacated on other grounds,
419 Mich. 872, 347 N.W.2d 696 (1984).
118. Wall, 393 N.W.2d at 764.
119. Id. The court stated that even if Lewis' representation of the Doctors continued
up to the time that Rufer was hired in July 1979, more than the two-year statutory period
had elapsed before the Doctors commenced their action against Lewis. Id. Therefore,
unless Lewis continued to represent the Doctors past July 1979, summary judgment for
Lewis would be appropriate. Id.
120. Id. The court acknowledged that the failure of the attorneys to address the
continuous representation rule could possibly be because depositions were taken prior to its
decision in Binstock v. Tschider, the first case in which the North Dakota Supreme Court
acknowledged the possible applicability of the continuous representation rule to legal
malpractice actions. Id.; see Binstock v. Tschider, 374 N.W.2d 81, 85 (N.D. 1985) (no
evidence introduced requiring the application of the continuous representation rule).
121. Wall, 393 N.W.2d at 764.
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be clarified with further discovery, it was appropriate to allow the
parties additional time to develop evidence.' 22 Therefore, the
court remanded the case and concluded that the Doctors ought to
be granted additional time to produce evidence to support their
allegations that Lewis' representation of them continued beyond
July 1979.123
In adopting the continuous representation rule to toll the stat-
ute of limitations in legal malpractice actions, the North Dakota
Supreme Court recognized the importance of protecting the attor-
ney-client relationship. 124  After Wall, an attorney in North
Dakota will not be able to defeat a client's cause of action through
delay, but rather the attorney will have an opportunity to correct
his error or establish that there has been no error. 125 In addition,
speculative litigation will be avoided since clients will no longer be
forced to file questionable claims during representation in order to
meet the statute of limitations period.' 26 Furthermore, the attor-
ney will still be afforded the protection of a statute of limitations
which requires a client to be diligent in filing his claim once the
attorney-client relationship has ended. 127
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122. Id. In allowing the parties additional time for discovery, the court noted that Rule
56(f) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes additional discovery when
needed in considering motions for summary judgment. Id.; see N.D.R. CIv. P. 56(f) (court
may order a continuance to permit additional discovery).
123. Wall, 393 N.W.2d at 764.
124. See id. at 762-63.
125. See id. at 763; see also Wilson v. Econom, 56 Misc. 2d 272, -, 288 N.Y.S.2d 381,
384 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968) (court in adopting continuous representation rule was concerned
with an attorney defeating a client's claim against him through delay). For a discussion of
Wilson, see supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
126. See Wall, 393 N.W.2d at 763; see also Note, supra note 112, at 1029 (continuous
representation rule avoids speculative litigation as clients are not required to file suit before
the attorney attempts to avoid damage to the client's interest).
127. See Wall, 393 N.W.2d at 763.
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